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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID McMURDIE, WILLIAM
WHITTAKER, CAROL WHIT~
TAKER, and DENISE WHITTAKER by her Guardian Ad
Litem, William Whittaker,
P~a:intijjs and Appellants,
vs.
ALVIN UNDERWOOD, JOSEPH
-JOHNSON, H. E. WOOLF, and
NORTH AMERICAN VAN
LINES,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8894

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
ALVIN UNDERWOOD AND JOSEPH JOHNSON
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY AND DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS;
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE VERDICT.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This personal injury suit was pre-tried to the
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge, Third Judicial District Court, on April 5, 1958, and subsequently went
1
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to jury trial on the Pretrial Order vvhich read, in
part, as follows:
The following matters are not in dispute,
and no proof will be required at the trial hereof to establish 'the same :
1. A collision occurred on the 15th day
of December, 1956, at about one forty-five
o'Clock in the morning.
2. Three tractor-trailers were stopped,
all facing east, at the scene of the accident.
3. The easternmost tractor-trailer belonged to the North American Van Lines, Inc.,
and was driven by H. E. Woolf, who was an
employee of North American Van Lines, Inc.,
and was at the time in the course of his employment.
4. The middle truck was owned by
Joseph Johnson and was driven by Alvin Underwood.
5. The driver of the westernmost truck
is to the parties unknown a't this thne.
6. An automobile belonging to and
driven by William Whittaker stopped behind
the truck owned by Joseph Johnson.
7. A pick-up 'truck registered in the
name of Frontier Sales, Inc., a corporation,
and given by said corporation into the possession of Keith M. Olsen was driven easterly
by Nancy Dillingham, a minor of the age of
sixteen years at the time, and who had no
driver's license nor learner's license to drive
a car.
8. Keith M. Olsen was in the pick-up
2
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truck at the time of the collision and had
given Nancy Dillingham permission to drive
said truck.
9. The truck driven by Nancy Dillingham crashed into the rear of the car owned
by William Whittaker.
10. The westernmost truck had stopped
on the highway because it had been disabled
in its lighting system, but the repairs had been
completed and the rear lights were operating
a't the time of the collision referred to above.
11. The other two tractor-trailers had
stopped for the purpose of rendering aid to
the westernmost tractor-trailer.
It is the contention of William Whittaker
and all plaintiffs named in case No. 111502
that the drivers of each of the tractor-trailers
were negligent in stopping their vehicles because they blocked a part of the paved portion
of the highway and were further negligent
because they did not have lighted flares set
out or gave no warning to Nancy Dillingham
of the fact that they were blocking the highway. Said plaintiffs will further contend that
the drivers of the tractor-trailers were negligent in parking their vehicles so close together
as to c1·eate a trap.
It is the further contention of William
Whittaker and the occupants of his car that
they suffered damages and injuries because
of negligence on 'the part of Nancy Dillingham
in the following particulars :
(a) She drove at a rate of speed greater than was safe, reasonable, and prudent in
view of all the surrounding circumstances.
3
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(b) She failed to keep and maintain
a proper lookout for other vehicles upon the
highway and particularly for the vehicle
owned by William Whittaker.
(c) She was an unlicensed driver and
not qualified to operate the vehicle which she
purported to drive.
(d) She drove the pick-up truck at a
time when she was drowsy from fatigue.
William Whittaker and the occupants of
his car claim damages as set forth in the complaint filed in case No. 111502.
It is the contention of North American
Van Lines, Inc., H. E. Woolf, Joseph Johnson,
and Alvin Underwood that they were not
negligent as claimed by William Whittaker
or at all and that even if they were negligent,
their negligence, if any, could not be a proximate cause of any injuries sustained by William Whittaker and the occupants of his car
or Nancy Dillingham and Keith M. Olsen.
It is the further contention of Joseph
Johnson that the truck had been leased to
Security Foods and that Alvin Underwood at
the time of the accident was the servant of
Security Foods and not his agent.
It is the contention of Keith M. Olsen
that he received injuries because of negligence
on the part of Alvin Underwood in parking
the Johnson truck so as to block traffic on the
paved portion of the highway and without
setting out flares or having lights on his truck
and trailer at the time of the collision.
It is the further contention of Keith M.
4
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Olsen, Nancy Dillingham, and Frontier Sales
Corporation that Nancy Dillingham was not
negligent as claimed or at all.
The Court will hold as a matter of law
that Keith M. Olsen is chargeable with the
negligence of Nancy Dillingham and that
Nancy Dillingham was negligent as a matter
of law, and for that reason will dismiss the
action of Keith M. Olsen with prejudice and
hold that Keith M. Olsen and Nancy Dillingham are liable to the plain tiffs in case No.
111502.
The court further finds that there exists the
following:
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT
1. Were the defendants Alvin Underwood and H. E. Woolf or either of them guilty
of negligence as charged by plaintiffs in case
No. 111502?
2. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of the collision?
3. Was Alvin Underwood an agent,
servant, and employee and in the course of
employment with Joseph Johnson at the tin1e
he parked the Johnson tractor-trailer on the
highway?
4. What amount of damages did each of
the plaintiffs named in case No. 111502 sustain as a proximate result of any negligence
on behalf of the named defendants?
DISPUTED ISSUES OF LAW
1. Are plaintiffs in case No. 111502
entitled to recover from 1~ orth American Van
Lines and H. E. Woolf?
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2. Are said plaintiffs entitled to re~
cover from Joseph Johnson and Alvin Underwood or either of them?
3. Are said plaintiffs entitled to recover
from Frontier Sales, a corporation?
(R. 34-37).
As to these respondents and the respondents
Woolf and North American Van Lines, 'the verdict
returned was "No Cause of Action."
Other defendants, the Olsens and Frontier Sales
Corporation, made an independent settlement just
prior to trial and were dismissed from the action
upon mdtion of appellants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These respondents join with the respondents
Woolf and North American Van Lines in declining
to accept appellants' staten1ent of fact and also
assert that appellants' brief relates only such facts
as most strongly support their own contentions. We
adopt the Staternent of Facts of respondents \Yoolf
and North American Van Lines in its entirety and
add briefly thereto.
All vehicles involved were traveling east on
U. S. 40-50 shortly after one o'clock in the morning.
There is evidence as 'to five separate motor vehicles;
they are referred to throughout the record as truck
units 1, 2, and 3, the Nash automobile and the
6
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Chevrolet pickup. We so refer to each one in this
brief.
Unit No. 1 had difficulty with its headlights
and pulled off to the south extremity of the highway, partially on and partially off the paved surface. Unit No. 2 passed Unit No. 1 and also pulled
up on the south side of the road 150 to 175 feet in
front of No. 1 (R. 221); Unit No. 3 passed both
No. 1 and No. 2 and also stopped on the southerly
side of the road about the same distance ( 150 to
175 feet) in front of No. 2. Thus the parked trucks
were lined up - not, as appellants say (Appellants'
Brief, page 5) as a "solid wall of trucks."
Your appellant, William Whittaker, driving his
Nash automobile, came upon the Units 1, 2 and 3 as
they were so parked; he slowed to pass No. 1 and
admits that Unit had its clearance lights on. (R.
134). He pulled up and stopped behind No. 2 ( R.
135-137); he was "straddling his rear duals." (R.
141). Howard E. Cooper, Trooper, Utah Highway
Patrol, was asked :
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether
or not there \vas roorn between the left hand
side of any one of the vehicles, the three trucks
that we have been talking about, and the
center lane for a passenger car to have moved
without going over the center line?
He answered:
A. I think so.
Q. And what is the opinion?
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

I think they could pass.
(R. 235).
The Nash was further towards the center line
of the highway than Uni't No. 2 behind which he
was stopped; its driver testified:
A. I was right behind his rear duals on
the left side which would be towards the
middle line. I was straddling his rear duals.
I had approximately my fenders and part of
the windshield looking right up the side of
his truck. ( R. 141).
Nancy Dillingham, then a single girl of 16
years ( R. 255), was driving the Chevrolet pickup
truck; she drove the pickup past Unit No. 1 and
rammed into the rear of the Nash. (R. 251-261).
The Chevrolet pickup laid down only eight feet of
skid marks from the left front tire (R. 226); it
knocked the strenuously 'braked Nash automobile
(R. 145) 10 feet into the rear of Unit No. 2 (R.
226).
The weather was clear and the road was dry.
( R. 222). Nancy Dillingham and her present husband, Keith Olsen, had been rabbit hunting with
four other couples on the night of the accident. (R.
241) ; there were three cars in the hunting party,
the driver of one of these cars testified that he could
see the parked Unit No. 1 and its lights from its
rear when he was one thousand feet from it. ( R.
243).
8
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ARGUMENT
Your appellants' rely upon error in the instructions and upon 'the 'trial court's refusal to give
certain requested instructions. We shall examine
first the instructions complained of as given.
Instruction No. 27.
You are instructed that the driver of the
pickup 'truck was negligent as a matter of
law, and if you find that she observed the
hazards, if any, of the stopped vehicles upon
the highway or under the circumstances
should have observed said vehicles, but because of her negligence failed to do so in time
to a void said accident, then you are instructed
that the negligence on her part was the sole
proximate cause of the collision, and your
verdict must be in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action.
(R. 103).
Appellant cites no authority for his objection
to this instruction bu't claims that the instruction
constituted a directed verdict against appellants.
The instruction informs the jury that Nancy Dillinghan1 vvas negligent as a matter of law [as determined at pretrial] and goes on to instruct the jury
that:
If you find that she observed the hazards
* * * or under the circumstances should have
observed but * * * failed to do so * * * then
* * * the negligence on her part was the sole
proximate cause of the collision * * *
9
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That is sound law. In Hillyard v. Utah By·
Products Co., 1 U. 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287, this Court
wrote:
In applying the test of foreseeability to
situations where a negligently created preexisting condition combines 'vith a later act
of negligence causing an injury, the courts
have drawn a clear-cut distinction between
two classes of cases. The first situation is
where one has negligently created a dangerous condition [such as par king the truck]
and a later actor observed, or circumstances
are such that he could not fail to observe,
but negligently failed to avoid it. The second
situation involves conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently failed to observe the dangerous condition until it is too
late to avoid it. In regard to the first situation it is held as a matter of la-w that the
later intervening act does interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut off the legal
effect of the negligence of the initial actor.
This is based upon the reasoning that it is
not reasonably 'to be foreseen nor expected
that one who actually becomes cognizant of
a dangerous condition in ample time to avert
injury will fail to do so. On the other hand,
with respect to the second situation, where
the second actor fails to see the danger in
time to avoid it, it is held that a jury question
exists, based on the rationale that it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstances may
arise wherein others n1ay not observe the
dangerous condition until too late to escape
it. The distinction is basically one between a
situation in which the second actor has suf10
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ficient tin1e, after being charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and one in
which the second actor negligently becomes
confronted with an emergency situation.
It was neither claimed nor proven,in this cause,
that Nancy Dillingham was confronted with an
emergency situation - therefore the issue went to
the jury under this complained of instruction
as to whether or not she observed the hazard or
should have observed the hazard and failed to do so
so as to make her negligence the sole proximate
cause of the collision. Instruction No. 27 becomes
free from doubt when read in conjunction with Instruction No. 14 as given. Instruction No. 14 reads:
The terms "negligence", "ordinary care",
and "proximate cause", as used in 'these instructions, are defined as follows:
a. "Negligence" means the failure to
do what a reasonably prudent person would
have done under 'the circumstances of the
situation, or doing what such person under
such existing ci:rcun1stances would not have
done. The essence of the fault may He in acting or omitting to act. The duty is dictated
and measured by the exigencies of the occasion;
b. "'Ordinary care" is 'that degree of
care which a reasonably prudent person vvould
use under the same or similar circumstances.
"Ordinary care" implies the exercise of reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight as under all the circumstances of the particular case would 'be exer11
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cised by a reasonably careful, prudent person ;
c. By "proximate cause" is meant that
cause which is a natural, continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produced the
injury and without which the injury would
not have occurred. (R. 89).
And Instruction No. 15 reads:
With respect to the matter of proximate
cause, referred to in 'the foregoing Instruction No. 14, if you find that the said accident
would have happened \v'hether or not the defendent H. E. Woolf stopped and parked his
truck where he did, your verdict should be in
favor of defendants Woolf and North American Van Lines, no cause of action.
Similarly if you find that the said accident
would have happened whether or not the defendant Alvin Underwood stopped and parked
his 'truck where he did, your verdict should
be in favor of defendants Underwood and
Johnson, no cause of action.
To be able to so find, however, you must
also find that in stopping and parking as they
did, said drivers reasonably could not have
foreseen that stopping and parking as they
did, combined with the subsequent events that
did take place, would result in the accident
and injuries complained of. ( R. 90) .
It is fundamental that:
* * * a proper charge to a jury 1nay entail quite a number of instructions, the framing of which in language meaningful to laymen and consistent with legal precepts poses
such a problem that losing counsel can usually
find some fla,vs or inconsistencies to form a
1~
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basis for a plausible argument that the
jury were misdirected. Due allowances
must be made for this fact and the instructions must be considered altogether and
viewed with tolerance and understanding to
see whether the basic issues were fairly
and intelligibly presented for determination. If that purpose is accomplished, that
is all that is necessary, and no verdict
should be nullified for minor errors or
inconsistencies in the instructions. * * *
Heywood v. Denver and Rio Grande Western
~Co.,

6 U. 2d 159, 307 P. 2d 1045, 1047.

Appellant complains also of the Court's
Instruction No. 23; it reads:
You are instructed that the evidence
is undisputed that the defendants stopped
to render assistance to the driver of
Truck No. 1 and in this connection you
are further instructed that they were under
no duty to place lighted flares around
their vehicles. {R. 99).
Sec. 41-6-153, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
states in substance that the driver of a disabled vehicle must place flares or other warning
devices on the highway during the hours of darkness.

The legislative intent seems clear that
this section applies only to vehicles which have

13.
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become disabled.

Certainly the legislature did

not intend to require a vehicle making a temporary
stop to put out flares, particularly when all
of its lights were on_ including flashing lights
in the rear, which was undisputed in this in&tance.

Alvin Underwood's first concern was to

assist the disabled truck.

Upon learning that the

lighting difficulty was minor, he repaired i t in
less time than would have been required to place
flares.

When the accident occurred repairs had

been completed, and the truck drivers were on
their way back to get into their trucks and leave
the scene.

Would not the situation have been

the same if flares had been placed at the time
the collision occurred?

They would have been

gathered up, preparatory to leaving.

The issue

of whether flares should have been used seems
immaterial when the evidence is undisputed that
Nancy Dillingham did see "a bunch of lights from
further down the road, and as I came closer, I
thought that unit was moving." (R. 252).

13a.
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Cer-

tainly, this was notice sufficient to require
her to have her vehicle under control so that she
could avoid a collision with the Whittaker car,
which was there to be seen, had she been looking.
Even if there had been a violation of the
Utah traffic law by defendants, such was not a
proximate cause of the collision.

13b
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basis for a plausible argument that the jury
were misdirected. Due allowances must be
1nade for this fact and the instructions must
be considered altogether and viewed with tolerance and understanding to see whether the
basic issues were fairly and intelligibly presented for determination. If that purpose is
accomplished, that is all that is necessary,
and no verdict should be nullified for minor
errors or inconsistencies in the instructions.
* * *
Heywood v. Denver and Rio Grande Western
R. Co., 6 U. 2d 159, 307 P. 2d 1045, 1047.
Appellant complains also of the Court's Instruction No. 23; it reads:
You are instructed that the evidence is
undisputed that the defendants stopped to
render assistance to the driver of Truck No.
1 and in this connection you are further instructed that they were under no duty to
place lighted flares around their vehicles.
(R. 99).
We concede that the violation of a traffic law
constitutes negligence as a matter of law, but, as
this Court has said :
We have said that violation of a traffic
law constitutes negligence as a matter of law,
but that such violation may not be the proximate cause of an injury. Without determining the correctness of the trial court's interpretation of the statute as applicable to the
facts here, we believe in error the ruling that
the driver's negligence, if any, because of
violation of the statute * * *,was a proximate
cause of the injury.
13
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Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 U. 2d 171, 263 P. 2d
796; Gibbs v. Blue Orob Co., 122 U. 312, 249 P. 2d
213; On Rehearing, 123 U. 281, 259 P. 2d 294. The
rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission may
well have the force of statute, however, the same
rule of law would be applicable thereto and we do
not here concern ourselves with appellants' contentions for I.C.C. rules since that issue was not
raised during the trial of this cause.

Next appellant com plains of the trial court's
refusal to give appellants' requested instructions
Nos. 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20 21, 34 and 35.
By refusing to give these requested instructions the
Court below did not err if the instructions as given
by the Court enabled the jury to correctly understand the issues. We submit that the instructions
given when considered each in the light of the other
and altogether correctly apprised the jury of the
law and issues in this cause. Prejudicial error would
have undoubtedly occurred had the Court given the
requested instructions of appellant for at least three
reasons: 1st: The requested instructions place undue emphasis on applicable laws favorable to appellants' side. Shields v. Utah Light and Ttaction Co.,
99 U. 507, 105 P. 2d 347; 2nd: Continual reference
and repeating of certain law propositions (flares,
parking, etc.) would result in the unbalancing of
the charge to the jury. Devine v. Cook, 3 U. 2d 134,
1.!
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279 P. 1073; 3rd: The requested instructions were
inconsistent with the evidence as to the proximate
cause of the accident- the jury undoubtedly found,
as it well could, that the negligence of Nancy Dillingham ( 0 lsen) was the sole proximate cause of
the collision.
Finally, appellant com plains of the trial court's
refusal to give appellants' instruction No. 1. Tha't
requested instruction reads:
Defendants, Alvin Underwood, Joseph
Johnson, H. E. Woolf, and the North American Van Lines, were required to park off the
traveled portion of the highway if it is practicable. The word, "practicable" is not synonymous with convenient and the circumstances of the case are con trolling and are to
be considered by you. The failure on the part
of the defendants to exercise due care under
the circru1nstances in this respect requires you
to find them negligent and to award damages
against them. (Emphasis ours). (R. 40).
The violation of a traffic statute as hereinabove
pointed out \Vas not and could not be determinative
of the proxin1ate cause of the injury - the issue,
determinable under the facts, for the jury.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the evidence amply supports
the finding of the jury of "No Cause of Action"
against respondents Alvin Underwood and Joseph
15
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Johnson; that the evidence conclusively shows that
your appellant William Whittaker parked improperly behind Unit No. 2 (by being closer to the center
line of the highway and further obstructing the
roadway) and 'that William Whittaker could have
in all safety driven on without stopping; that the
negligence of Nancy Dillingham (Olsen) was the
sole proximate cause of the collision.
The verdict of the jury should not be disturbed.
Respectfully submitted
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
WALTER L. BUDGE
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, U'tah
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents Alvin Underwood
and Joseph Johnson.
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